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RAILROADS-ASSUmPTION

OF

RISK-CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLI-

GENCE-STATUTORY PROVISIONS.-Coley V. North Carolina B.

Co., 40 S. E. 195. (Supreme Court of North Carolina, December, 1901.) This is a.base decided under. the North Carolina
Employer's Liability Act of January 23, 1897, which provides:
(1) That any servant or employe of any railroad company operating in the state shall maintain an action against such company
for injury received by the negligence of a fellow-servant, or by
any defect in the machinery, ways or appliances of the company.
(2) That any contract or agreement, expressed or implied, made
by any employe of said company to waive that benefit, shall be
null and void.
The plaintiff was a yard conductor and his duties required
him to ride on the tender of the shifting engine. Some time
previous to the accident the regular switch engine with sloping
tender had been taken away and a road engine substituted. On
the back of the tender, there was a platform about six inches
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wide and about twelve inches above the track. This was a safe
place to stand and was provided with a handhold; but it was an
uncomfortable place to stand, as the conductor would have to
lean around the corner of the tender to signal the engineer.
Above this platform there was a tool-chest, which was a safe
place to stand and signal the engineer. The way provided for
getting up on this box was a step at the side; but there was no
grab iron, and the plaintiff had to use either the top of the
tender or a drain-pipe. He had used the drain-pipe on one side
about three hundred times; but the one on the other side broke
on the fourth or fifth time, letting him fall on the track in front
of the tender, which was moving backwards. The pipe, if properly constructed, would support one thousand pounds. The
plaintiff, when injured, was not getting up at the side, by the
step provided, but from the lower platform..
The defendant contended that the plaintiff assumed the risk
in continuing to work and not reporting the absence of a handhold as a defect; but the court held that the statute took away the
defence of assumption of risk, and as the jury found that the
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, the court said:
"We cannot disturb the verdict or reverse the judgment on any
view we may have as to the mere right of evidence." Justice
Cook (dissenting) contended that the statute does not take away
the defence of assumption of risk, and further, that as the plain-'tiff was not getting up at the side by the way provided;-but in
a. way not contemplated or suggested by the structure of the
machine, his injuries did not result from the failure of the
defendant to put grab irons on the engine and the trial judge
should have so instructed the jury.
The opinion in this case is important: (1) as to the construction put upon the statute; (2) as to how far that construction
changes the common law rule.
When this case was before the Supreme Court, in June, 1901,
(128 N. C. 534), the court decided that the statute takes away
from the employer the plea of assumption of risk The court
said: "It is agreed that assumption of risk is contractural either.
by express terms, or by implication; and the disputes usually
were as to whether the plaintiff contracted by implication or
assumption, of dangers not existing at the date of employment.
And it would seem by this act that the Legislature intended to
put an end to such contentions, by saying in the first section,
that he shall have a right of action caused by such defective
machinery, and by providing in the second section, that he cannot
waive this right by contract expressed or implied."" The argument of the court is, that if a servant expressly contracts to
waive that right, it is void; and if, after discovering a defect in
a machine which makes it dangerous, he continues to work without giving the master notice, that is an implied contract to waive
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the right, and is also void by the statute. In support of this
construction the court cites Lord Esher's dissenting opinion in
Thomas v. Quartermain,182 B. D. 685 (1887) ; and Smith v.
Baker, Appeal Cases, L. R. H. of L., 1891, page 325. Both of
which were decided under the Employer's Liability Act of 1880,
which contained a section that an employe'shall not maintain an
action against his master for injury received from defective
machinery, unless he gives notice of such defects to the master
or some one superior to him, unless the master already knows of
the defect. The court says of the latter case: "A majority of
the Lords, who put their opinion upon the Employer's Act of
1880, agreed with Lord Esher, that the statute did destroy or
do away with the implied assumption of risk

.

.

and if

-there could be reason for such a construction upon a statute
which did not in terms declare such object, but where the legislative will to that effect had to be found in the negative expressions of the statute, how could we escape such a construction
where the legislative intent is manifested in express terms, and
in the most emphatic manner ?"
But it does not seem that this is the accepted interpretation
of those cases. The Massachusetts Court, in the case of O'Mal.ley v. The Gas Co., 158 Mass. 138 (1893), which was decided
under the Employer's Liability Act, which is substantially the
same as the English Act, says: "It is also established by an
adjudication in this court, and by decisions under a similar
statue in England, that it has not taken away the defence that
the plaintiff knowing and appreciating the dangers voluntarily
assumed the risk." And in support of that proposition, it quotes
the two English cases mentioned above. The plaintiff in the
case of Smith v. Baker (supra), was employed to drill holes in a
rock, close by a crane worked by men in the same employ. Occasionally a stone was swung over the head of the plaintiff without
warning. A stone having fallen and injured the plaintiff, he
sued the contractor under the Employer's Act. The jury found
that the omission to supply special means of warning was a
defect in the plant. Lord Halsbury in delivering the opinion
of the court, said: "I am of opinion that the application of the
maxim volenti non fit injuria, is not warranted by these facts.
I did not think the -plaintiff did consent at all. His attention was fixed upon a drill and while, therefore, he was unable to take precautions himself, a stone was negligently slung
over his head, without due precautions against its being permitted to fall." The statute ivas not called. in to decide the
case. The judge further says-: "A.negligent system, or a negligent mode of using perfectly sound machinery may make the
employer liable quite apart from any of the provisions of the
Employer's Act." Buswell on "Personal Injuries," in commenting on this case, says: "The specific point decided in this
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case was that when the dangers arise from an operation in
another department of the business from that in which the
plaintiff is engaged, and one over which he has no control, the
mere fact that he understands the danger, is not conclusive
to show that he assumes the risk; and the question of whether he
does assume it is one of fact."
Justice Cook in his dissenting opinion in the present case,
disagrees with the construction put upon the statute by the
majority opinion of the court. He does not think it warranted
by the text, or by the remedy intended to be provided by the
Legislature which passed it. He says: "The mischief to be remedied was to release a fellow-servant from his responsibility
for the negligence of a fellow-servant; and, second, to secure to
the employe the right of action for injuries inflicted on account
An analysis of the statute
of defects in the machinery. . .
shows two propositions: (1) To change the relationship existing
between felow-servants and make them vice-principals as to each
other with respect to injuries resulting on account of their negligence, and to prevent them from forfeiting their right of action
by contract. (2) To prevent an employe from waiving his right of
action for injuries received on account of defectsinthemachinery,
ways or appliances, or, in other words, a right of action accrues
to a fellow-servant, and the right to waive either actioin by an
employe is forbidden. . . . These relations being established
by statute, the liability of the railroad company as to furnishing
safe and suitable machinery, ways and appliances, and the relationship of the employe and his assumption of risks in the perNor do I
formance of his work remain unchanged. . '
understand that it is within the purview of the statute either by
expression or intendment, to abrogate the doctrine of assumption of risk. From the nature of the employer corporation, it
is compelled to operate through, and depend upon its officers and
An employe's failure to give notice of defects
employes. . ..
leads the employer to assume that none exist to the great hazard
of its property and service. But, should he continue in the use
of such, knowing the defects and failing to give the employer
an opportunity of making the remedy, then he does so knowingly
and willingly and must be considered to have undertaken to run
the risks incident thereto.'
This view adopted by Justice Cook is in conformity with the
English and American interpretation of the Employer's Liability
Act. A number of states have passed the act giving the servant
a right of action for injury caused by the negligence.of a fellowservant; but only a few: Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina and South Carolina have extended the act to include injuries
from defective machinery, and the first two states qualify the
employer's liability as in the English Act by providing that the
servant assumes the risk when he works on failing to give notice
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of a defect, unless the master already knows of the defect. South
Carolina, however, provides in Article IX, Section 5, of the
constitution that "knowledge, by any employe of a railroad company injured, of the defective or unsafe character or condition of
any machinery, ways or appliances, shall be no defence to an
action for injury caused thereby except as to conductors or
engineers in charge of dangerous or unsafe ears or engines
voluntarily operated by them." Bodie v. Charleston and W. C.
By. Co., 39 S. E. 715 (Supreme Court, S. C., 1901). This
provision leaves no doubt upon the question and it seems that if
the North Carolina Legislature intended to enact the same provision by the words "implied contract" in the second section,
it should have been more expliit as was the South Carolina
Constitution.
Justice Cook's opinion is further supported by the well settled
rule that statutes should be interpreted so as to conform, if possible, to the common law rule. In Cook v. Myer, 73 Ala. 580
(1883), the court in quoting from 1 Kent. 464, says: "It is a
recognized rule of statutory construction that a statute in modification or derogation of the common law will not be presumed
to alter it, further than is expressly declared. The presumption
is that the language and terms of the statute import the alteration or change it was designed to effect and their operation
will not be enlarged by construction or intendment." And in
Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244 (1880), the court says: "We
assume it as a safe rule, that even where a statute is equally
susceptible of two constructions, one of which is in harmony
with a clearly settled principle of the common law, and the
other in abrogation of it, the courts will adopt the former and
not the latter."
Substantial justice seems to have been done in this case, as it
is hard to say that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence either in failing t report the defect in the absence of
the handhold, or in pulling himself up by the drainpipe; but the
cour has gone further than was necessary to decide the ease.
The general rule seems to be that an employe who works at a
patently defective machine, when he knows or ought to know
of the defect, assumes the risk and cannot recover from injury
therefrom. Texas and P. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 57 Fed. Rep. 378
(1897) ; Powers v. New York, L. E. and W. R. R., 98 N. Y. 274
(1885); Carbine v. Bennington and Rutland R. R., 61 Vt. 348
(1889); Southern ,Pacific Go. v. Johnson, 44 U. S. Appeals 1
(1895). But mere knowledge is not sufficient to prevent recovery
although appliances be defective- or dangerous, if the apprehension of danger is not such as would occur to a reasonable
man. Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 89 Mo. 650 (1886);
Fisk v. Ill. Central B. R., 96 Iowa, 702 (1896) ; Lee v. Smart,
45 Neb. 318 (1895); Benham v. Taylor, 66 Mo. App. 308
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(1896). The whole question in such cases is whether or not the
employe has been guilty of contributory negligence in continuing
in his employment after he has discovered the existence of the
defect." Lee v. Smart (supra); Benham v. Taylor (supra);
Lawless v. Connecticut B. R., 136 Mass. (1883); Ford v. Fitchburg R. R., 110 Mass. 240 (1872).
It seems that the plaintiff could have recovered under the
common law rule or under the rule in Smith v. Baker (supra).
In Ford v. Fitchburg R. R. Company (supra), the plaintiff,
who was an engineer, knew that there was a defect in his
boiler, but he continued in his employment and the cout
held that the defendant was liable for the injury, the defect
being due to the negligence of its agents charged with the duty
of seeing that its locomotives were kept in proper order.' And
in Lawless v. Connecticut R. R. (supra), it was held that the
fact that a brakeman in the employ of the railroad knew of the
existence' of a defect in the car on which he was employed,
which defect caused the injury, was not decisive against his
right of recovery in an action for his injury; the ground of the
decision being that the fact of knowledge was not conclusive
of the plaintiff's negligence.
But the court went upon the broad ground that the statute
does away entirely with the doctrine of assumption of risk,
though not of contributory negligence.' It says: "As the law now
stands, the use of machinery obviously defective will not prevent
the plaintiff from a recovery from an injury resulting therefrom,
unless the apparent danger is so great that its assumption would
amount to a reckless indifference to probable consequences.
What is recklessness . . . is a matter of fact for the jury.
The danger of the defective machine must be not only apparent,
but so great that there are more chances against its safe use.
than there are in favor of it." The language of the court here
is not only broader than the general rule; but it seems that it;
is broader than is necessary to carry out the construction put.
upon the statute. To say flatly that the use of machinery
"obviously defective" will not prevent a recovery unless the
employe is reckless, and to define recklessness to be the use of
-machinery which the employe knows to be so dangerous that
there are more chances against its safe use than there are in
favor of it, is to relieve the employe from practically all responsibility. This definition of recklessness the court takes from
Henshaw v. Raleigh and A. A. L. R. R., 24 S. E. 426 (Nqorth
Carolina, 1896). But in that case it was not applied to the use
of machinery. A passenger got off of a car at a dangerous place
in obedience to the orders of the conductor, and the court held
that to 'constitute contributory negligence in the plaintiff, after
having been told by the conductor to get off, "the danger must
be not only apparent, but great,-more chances against a safe
exit than there are in favor of it."
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The statute, however, the court says, does not take away the
defence of contributory negligence in the real meaning of the
term. It says: "A defective machine carefully handled, or a
safe machine carelessly handled may equally result in an accident; but the resulting responsibility would be by no means the
same. But this distinction is not generally observed. In Texas
and P. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 57 Fed. Rep. 381 (1893), the court
in quoting from Wood's Ry. Law, paragraph 379, says: "A servant is bound to see patent and obvious defects in appliances
furnished him and assumes all patent and obvious risks, as well
as those incident to the business, and where he knows, or ought
to know, of the defect in the appliance, and continues to work
with the same, and receives injury therefrom, he is treated as
- being guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover."
It seems that an employe who will contihue to use an "obviously
defective" machine is guilty of contributory negligence in not
reporting it, and the consequence of departing from this established common law rule will tend to encourage carelessness in
the employes to the great hazard of the railroad company. Says
Justice Cook: "The railroad company necessarily sees through
the eyes of its employes and a proper performance of its service
and duties is dependent .upon their eyes, good sense and good
*judgment. Whether machinery, ways and appliances are sound
or defective depends upon the knowledge and skill of its officers
and employes, upon whom there must rest an obligation to make
known and have remedied such defects when discovered, as well
as to inspect them before and during use for the security of
themselves as well as those using them."
The effect of the construction put upon the statute does not
very much change the common law rule, but the language used in
defining recklessness and making that the test of contributory
negligence, indicates a considerable departure; but as contributory negligence is left to the jury, it may be that the practical
working out of the statute will not result in as wide a divergence
as the language indicates.
J.A.R.
CJARmE s-DUTY To CARRY SLEEPING CARS-INJUBY TO
SLEEPING CAR PORTER-CONTRACTS LImITING LiABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENoE--CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTrs.

-Russell v. P. C. Q. & St. L. R. R. Co., 61 N. E. 678 (Supreme
Court of Indiana, 1901).-The"Supreme Court of Indiana here
extends to sleeping car porters the.law as previously enunciated
in the 6ase of express messengers. [See B. R. v. Keefer, 146 Ind.
21 (1896) ; R. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196 (1897.)]
A Pullman car was attached to one of the defendant railroad
.oLminnv's trains. Tha porter, employed by the Pullman fnm-
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pany, was injured by the negligence of the railroad employees.
The porter sued the railroad company for damages. In bar of
such action the defendant company pleaded two agreements. By
the terms of the one the Pullman Company was bound to indemnify the railroad for such liability. By the terms of the other
the plaintiff porter agreed with the Pullman Company to release
any railroad company over whose lines he operated in the employ
of the Pullman Company "from all claims for liability of any
nature or character on account of personal injury."
To this plea the plaintiff's attorney demurred; the demurrer
was.overruled; and on appeal from that decision the case came
before the Supreme Court of Indiana.
The decision of the lower court was sustained. The conclusion
that the above-stated agreements were a complete defence to a
claim for damage resulting from negligence, was reached by
Dowling, J., by the following interesting steps:
1. The railroad company was under no public duty to receive
the porter or the car on which he rode.
2. The railroad company could, therefore, contract specially
for a release from all liabilities for negligence as to the porter.
3. The contract of release between the porter and the Pullman
Company inures to the benefit of the railroad company referred
to therein, and can be taken advantage of by the railroad company in this action.
These several points will be considered in the above order.
1. While the rights and liabilities of sleeping car companies
have been the subject of legal decision in various aspects, this
particular point has never before been flatly decided. This case
holds that there is no duty, as a public carrier, on a railroad company to receive and haul Pullman sleeping cars in the manner
in which they do receive and haul them. This same view was
negatively recognized, however, in Pullman Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. R.
Co., 115 U. S. 587 (1885), where it was held that, inasmuch as
the Pullman Company had no special contract with the railroad,
it could not compel the railroad to carry its cars.
2. In most of the States of the Union, a railroad as a common
carrier may not contract against liability for negligence. (See
Petter on Carriers, § 398; R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357
(1873). However, "a common carrier may undoubtedly become
a private carrier or baillee for hire where, as a matter of accommodation or special engagement, he undertakes to convey something which it is not his business to convey" (R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, supra). The law on this point is tersely stated in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. 0. & G. R. R. Co., 19 S. C. 365 (1882). "If
he may carry or not as he deems best, he is but a private individual; and is invested, like all other private persons, with the
right to make his own contracts, and when made, to stand upon
them."
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This right of railroads, under certain conditions to contract as
private carriers, and when so contracting to exercise a private
carrier's right (see Hutchinson on Carriers, § 40) to stipulate
against liability for negligence, has been recognized by great
weight of authority. On this ground, clauses exempting from
liability for negligence have been sustained in contracts for the
carriage of circus trains by the Federal Courts and the Supreme
Courts of Michigan and Massachusetts (Chicago R. R. v. Wallace, 66 Fed. 506 (895); Coup v. Wabash B. B., 56 Mich. 11
(1885) ; Bobertson v. R. R., 156 Mass-525 (1892). In a suit
in Pennsylvania on a "circus train" contract made in New York
to be performed in New York, the law of New York was applied
and the contract enforced. Mitchell, J., in delivering his opinion said, that the contract even if made in Pennsylvania would
be enforceable by the Pennsylvania courts (Forepaugh v. R. B.,
128 Pa. 217 (1889). When acting as private parties railroads
have been allowed to stipulate against liability for negligence
resulting in fire. Hartford Ins. Co. v. B. B. Co., 70 Fed. 201
(1895). In the cases of contracts for the carriage of express
messengers -such exemptions have frequently been sustained.
B. & 0.R. R. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498 (1900); Blank v. B. R.,
182 fl1. 332 (1899); R. R. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196 (1897);
. B.v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21 (1896) ; Hosmer v. R. B., 156 Mass.
506, (1892); Bates v. B. B., 147 Mass. 255 (1888). We find
this right of a common carrier to contract as a private carrier
when not perforhing a franchise duty the ground for sustaining
exemptions from liability for negligence in Muldoon v. R. B., 10
Wash. 311 (1893); Quimby v. B. R., 150 Mass. 365 (1890);
Griswold v. B. R., 53 Conn. 371 (1885); Rogers v. Kennebec
S. S. Co., 86 Me. 261 (1894); Kinney v. B. B., 34 N. J. Law
513 (1869). Some apparent confusion has arisen from the cases
where the common carrier is contracting in a private capacity,
but fails. to exempt itself from liability for negligence. The
measure of care, and of liability in such cases has been various.
In numerous express imaessenger cases, where the "exemption
clause" was lacking or defective (Kenney v. B. B., 125 N. Y.
422 (1891) ; Blair v. R. B., 66 N. Y. 313 (1876) ; Brewer v.
B. R., 124 N. Y. 59 (1891) ; Kentuckcy R. R. v. Thomas, 79 Ky.
160 (1880) ; Jennings v. B. B., 15 Ont. App. 477 (1887) ;B. R
v. Adams, 6 Texas Civil App. 102 (1894); Yeomans v. Contra
Costa Co., 44 Cal. 71 (1872), and in a long series of postal clerk
cases where there is no "exemption clause" in the contract the
test of care 'and measure of liaBility was "as that required to a
passenger for hire."
In the case of a Pullman porter, however, where there was no
release from liability for negligence given to the railroad company, the measure of damage was not "as that required to a
esorg-r for Jiire" foi negligence was not presumed from the
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occurrence of the accident. The plaintiff porter was required to
prove negligence [Hughson v. R. R., 2 App. D. C. 98 (1893)].
In Jones v. R. R., 125 Mo. 666 (1894), where, on the other
hand, there was a contract exempting the defendant railroad
from negligence the railroad company's liability to a Pullman
porter was, none the less, held to be "as to a passenger for hire."
The conclusion reached by this Missouri judge was reached on
analogous contracts and facts by Judge Taft, in the case of an
express messenger [Voigt v. R. R., 79 Fed. 562 (1897)].
The dissenting opinion in another strictly analogous express
messenger ease in Illinois [Magruder, J., in Blank v. R. B., 182
Ill. 332 (1899)] concurs with Judge Taft's decision. It seems,
therefore, that-we are warranted in saying that the overruling
of Voigt v. R. B., 79 Fed. 562, by Shiras, J., in the case of
B. -& 0. R. R. v. Voigt, 176 lU. S. 498 (1900) has thrown the
weight of authority with the Indiana courts position as to the
validity of a contract exempting a railroad company from liability for negligence to a Pullman porter.
3. When we come to examine how the railroad was exempted
by contract we are presented to a phase of the "American Doctrine" as to contracts for the benefit of third parties, which is
recognized, but which is of comparatively rare occurrence.
The "American Doctrine" as generally stated is, that, "The
third party for whose benefit a contract is made may sue thereon" [American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, Vol. VII, p.
106 (cent. ed.), Hendrice v. Lindsay, 93 'U. S. 143 (1876);
NationalBank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878)]. It is also
stated that such third party for whose benefit a-contract is made,
"may recover thereon." [American Digest (cent. ed.), Vol. II,
Col. 845.] In the case under discussion, the contract between the
Pullman Company and the railroad, whereby the railroad was to
be indemnified, raised a legal duty to the railroad. The contract
between the Pullman Company and the porter made the railroad
an express beneficiary. Thus there is present every element to
give the railroad a beneficiary's rights under the Americani Doctrine even where modifications have been introduced[Vrooman
v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877); Durnhrrv. Raw, 135 N. Y.
219 (1892)].
Generally, the third party for whose benefit the contract is
made "enforces" it by suing on the contract. Here the third
party pleads th'e-contract as a defence.
The court allows this defence by the words: "And it (the R. R.
Co.) may now claim its advantages as one in whose interests the
agreement was executed." They cite Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind
394 (1899), in which the wording of the third party rule, "where
one agrees with another for sufficient consideration to do a thing
for the benefit of a third party, such third party may enforce the
same," is surely wide enough to include pleading such contract
as a defence.
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-Using such beneficial contract as a defence is permitted in
Jones v. R. B., 125 Mo. 666 (1894) ; B. R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 IT.
S. 498 (1900), and Blank v. B. B., 182 Ill. 332 (1899). In the
latter case the court said: "As the defendant's contract with the
express company is valid, therefore, the plaintiff's (an express
messenger) contract with the express company may be pleaded in
bar of his cause of action." There is a very clear exposition of
the law on this point in Saywood v. Dexter Herlin & Co., 72 Fed.
758 (1896), where Gilbert, J., says: "His right to plead in abatement of this action an agreement in forbearance of suit depends
wholly upon the terms of such agreement. He cannot call to his
aid covenants made between B. & 0. to which he was not party or
privy.
4. The ground is here definitely taken that in contracts made
in a private capacity, the "exemption clause" need only be broad
enough to include by necessary implication exemption in case of
negligence. Negligence need not be specifically mentioned.
The language of the contract here held to include negligence
was exemption from all claims for liability of any nature or
character whatsoever, on account of personal injury or death."
Russell v. P. C. 0. & St. L., 61 X. E. 678 (Ind. 1901).
In Hosmer v. R. B. Co., 156 Mass, 506 (1892), the words,
"Assume all risks of accident resulting from any cause," were
held to include negligence. Words identical with those used in
Russell v. P. C. C. & St. L. (supra), were held to include negligence in Jones -v. B. B., 125 Mo. 666 (1894). '"This company
shall not be liable under any circumstances for any injury to the
person," was held to include injury by negligence in Ill. Cent.
B. R. v. Read, 37 Ill. 486 (1865). Rogers v. S. S. Co., 86 Me.
261 (1894), and R. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196 (1897),
follow this same rule. England allows contracts exempting from
liability for negligence in public or private contracts of carriers.
In either case if the language is broad enough to include negligence, negligence is included: M. S. & L. R. R. v. Brown, 8 App.
Cas. 703 (1883).
In New York, however, language sufficiently broad to include
negligence does not suffice to raise an exemption from liability
for negligence. Negligence must be specifically mentioned:
Blair v. B. B., 66 N. Y. 314 (1876) ; Kenney v. B. B., 125 N. Y.
425 (1891).
J. A. R.

